

WHAT WE'VE COME THROUGH

CRITICISMS & ALLEGATIONS

NOT EASY

DAY-TO-DAY EFFORTS NEVER FLAGGED

NOT HERE TO OBJECT

AMERICAN PROCESS

30 YEARS WITHOUT A LIGHT

CONGRESS AND EXEC. HAD TO LEARN ABOUT INTELLIGENCE

COLBY SOUGHT 3 THINGS:

BETTER GUIDELINES

BETTER OVERSIGHT

BETTER SECURITY

HAVE ACQUIRED THEM OR THE BEGINNINGS OF THEM

E. O. 11905 (CONGRESS TO FOLLOW)

10B & SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE (HOPE HOUSE WILL FOLLOW)

GROWING RECOGNITION OF NEED FOR SECRECY

SURVIVED QUESTIONING OF NEED FOR INTELLIGENCE -- THIS AGREED

HAVE STRENGTHENED INTEL. OVERSIGHT; STRONGER ORGANIZATION ARRANGEMENTS

ARE ADJUSTING TO GUIDELINES

OUT OF DARKNESS -- SEEKING POP. UNDERSTANDING & SUPPORT

PUBLIC REACTION GOOD

UNIQUE AMERICAN STORY -- NOWHERE ELSE.

8 Sept 1976

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CHALLENGES

IMPROVING ANALYSES & THE PRODUCT

MAKING THE PRODUCT MORE WIDELY AVAILABLE

MANAGING & OVERSEEING WITHOUT DEADENING CREATIVITY.

MAKING USE OF TECHNOLOGY WISELY: R&D, ADP: TECH. COLLECTION

PURPOSE OF INTELLIGENCE

INFORMING

ALERTING

ESTIMATING

-- OBJECTIVITY IS OUR HALLMARK

PROCESS OF INTELLIGENCE -- CAN LIKEN IT TO THE PROCESS OF INDUSTRY

RAW MATERIALS -- FRAGMENTS OF INFO, DETAILS, FACTS

AND OTHER BITS OF VARYING VALIDITY ARE COLLECTED

AND FED INTO OUR MACHINERY (AN ANALYTIC OR PRODUCTION

OFFICE)

FACTORY DISTILLS THE PRODUCT INTO A VARIETY OF PRODUCTS --

FINISHED INTEL (FOR A VARIETY OF CONSUMERS)

INTEL MANAGERS SEEK TO DETERMINE CONSUMER NEEDS AND TO

TRANSLATE THOSE INTO REQUIREMENTS. BUT RESOURCES

ARE LIMITED SO WE HAVE TO HAVE PRIORITIES. THESE

DRIVE BUDGETS & RESOURCE ALLOCATIONS.

SOURCES OF RAW INTELLIGENCE

OVERT

TECH

HUMAN SOURCE COLLECTION

COVERT ACTION -- OR NEED. [REDACTED]


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A. The FSO's contribution to National Intelligence. The production side of the CIA house warmly welcomes Foreign Service reporting. We particularly benefit from the analytical content of your reports. Many of our analysts are area specialists, but being in the place where events are actually happening will afford you insights which no stateside expert can hope to achieve. Moreover, through political and economic analysis in the field, you can relate current developments to the concerns of the policy-makers; you can demonstrate how trends in the country of your assignment impinge on U.S. interests. This is a kind of reporting that our field stations must shy away from, lest they appear to be advocating specific policies. They cannot appear to have any axe to grind in their reporting. They have to stick to facts, or else ^{we} _{lose} our reputation for objectivity and impartiality.

Moreover, I want to assure you that CIA field stations most emphatically do not want to get into the overt reporting business. Our resources have been dwindling while new and esoteric requirements have been levied upon us, for example, the requirement to protect U.S. citizens and property, including your embassies overseas, against terrorism. There will, however, inevitably be disagreements between us over just what CIA should


and should not be sticking its nose into. The country team should serve as the forum for working out which requirements properly belong to the Foreign Service, and which to the clandestine side of the house. In negotiating these arrangements, you will find that the Chief of Station readily accepts the role of the Ambassador as the chief arbiter.

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ROLE OF INTELLIGENCE IN FOREIGN POLICY FORMULATION

The process of Intelligence

I. National Intelligence has two principal missions:

(a) to provide authoritative information and judgments about foreign developments to national foreign policymakers to serve as a basis for formulating and implementing national policy; (b) to warn policymakers of impending developments or situations abroad that could affect our national security.

A. By definition, National Intelligence is coordinated and agreed upon. It transcends the exclusive interest of any single agency or department.

B. Also by definition, the role of intelligence does not include participation in the formulation of policy; we advise, warn, estimate, report, and implement when so directed; we do not propose, defend, or recommend policy options. *Objectivity is the hallmark.*

II. While the role of intelligence does not vary, the way we do business certainly does, largely reflecting the style and preferences of various administrations.

A. Eisenhower--thoroughly staffed and full agreement when papers reached National Security Council meeting.

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- B. Kennedy and Johnson--did not use the NSC mechanism as such; more focus on an ad hoc task force to deal with specific policy issues (Cuban missile crisis).
- C. Nixon ~~revitalized~~ ^{reverted to} the NSC mechanism with Kissinger in dual role as Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. NSSMs and NSDMs
- D. Ford separated this dual role, but still uses NSC mechanism to staff issue papers and to handle crises (Washington Special Action Group [WSAG]).

III. Not only does each administration differ from the next, but the way an administration operates also changes over time.

- A. Initially any administration is interested more in the facts, and our task is to educate them.
(Carter briefings.) USSR Stat. Wps ME China conv. forces Africa
- B. As time goes by, they become more sophisticated and the questions become tougher and more penetrating; as their policies acquire focus, their questions are more targeted; and there is also a recognition that some questions do not have answers.

Driving our data base.

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IV. How we respond to consumer needs varies with the state of any given situation and the perceptions of the U.S. Government as to its seriousness.

A. Normal times:

1. PDB serves the President, NID provides current intelligence for high-level consumers; NIEs provide longer range assessments and judgments for policymakers. NSSMs, IIMs, focus on specific subjects of interest (Greek-Turkey military balance, etc.).
2. There is also a wide variety of products for working level: daily NID Cable; Current Intelligence Weekly; Economic Weekly; Oil Developments; S&T weekly--each tailored to the specific interests of a portion of the total consuming audience.
3. Specialized support: MBFR and SALT. *The Peacekeeping role.*
4. Large volume of research on military, economic, political, technological subjects--monograph is final product--military is most important field. Much of this is departmental intelligence produced by CIA, DIA, INR, etc., but it all serves policy-level consumers.

B. Crisis: It comes in all shapes and sizes, and each one differs from its predecessor. Key is flexibility and responsiveness. *National Sitrep; crisis control.*

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1. If development is foreseen, an Intelligence Alert Memorandum is often the first Community manifestation of imminent problem.
2. If crisis continues, DCI must offer more support in briefing and advisory role to WSAG. New National Situation Report procedure has been established. Other crisis management tools include [REDACTED] system, CRITIC systems, STATINTL direct telephone links, etc. (Korea and recent Lebanon evacuation examples).
3. If crisis continues to grow, role of DCI begins to change as likelihood of war (nuclear exchange, an imminent involvement of U.S. forces, or an attack on the U.S.) increases. This transition is still not clearly worked out. Discuss national/tactical interface and Command Relationship Agreement. Discuss developing National Command Authority concept, and problems this poses for CIA assets and role of DCI.

V. The CIA and the Community: DCI's three hats: Senior advisor, head of CIA, and head of the Intelligence Community.

- A. EO 11905 directs two deputies, one to manage daily affairs of CIA, one to manage Community resource allocations.

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- B. Community components: CIA, DIA, NSA, [REDACTED] service intelligence organizations, and parts of State

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C. Substance managed through NFIB, chaired by DCI. DDCI represents CIA. NIOs as substantive representatives of DCI initiate or manage major substantive community products such as NSSMs, NIEs, IIMs--some take months, such as NIE 11-3/8, others done quickly in response to perceived or expressed needs of policymakers. NIOs define Key Intelligence Questions as guidance to collectors and help to judge whether needs are being met; if not, they help to devise collection requirements. NIOs participate in assessment of collection effectiveness via Focus Reviews, KEP process, etc.

D. Management of Community resources through the Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI), chaired by DCI with Deputy Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) and Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. First time mechanism has existed to carry out desires expressed since Kennedy for DCI to manage entire Community (National Foreign Intelligence Program [NFIP]). Nixon Directive of November 1971 really began process. Department of Defense (DoD) has [redacted] percent of Community resources. CIA [redacted] percent.

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E. CIA: Collects intelligence through clandestine means; processes and distributes intelligence on its own [REDACTED] or as Executive Agent (NPIC); produces finished intelligence on political, military, economic, geographic, sociologic, and biographic subjects.

F. CIA can, when so directed by President and NSC, implement policy through covert means. EO 11905 created Operations Advisory Group to advise President on CA proposals. The OAG is chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the DCI are members; the Attorney General and Director, Office of Management and Budget, are observers. Proposals can come from State, DoD, NSC, CIA, Ambassadors, etc. After approval by OAG and the President, programs are then briefed to Congress per Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act.

VI. Afterwords:

A. CIA and the Intelligence Community have been targets of searching and painful examination. After 30 years, it was probably a good thing.

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1. We must not overreact and let criticism make us tentative and ineffective.
2. We must have support and confidence of American people.
3. EO 11905 established a new Executive oversight mechanism, the Intelligence Oversight Board. Three private citizens, chaired by Ambassador Murphy. Hears reports of Inspectors General and General Counsels regarding any improprieties and advise President and Attorney General. (Role of PFIAB not moral but substantive oversight and guidance.)
4. Congressional oversight: Seven committees in formal process (House and Senate Armed Services, House and Senate Appropriations, House International Relations, Senate Foreign Relations, and Senate Select Committee on Intelligence). Eleven other committees with claims: Government Operations, Judiciary (for FBI), Budget, etc. This is not consolidated oversight, which Community desperately needs if it is to protect valid intelligence secrets.

B. This audience will go out into real world of foreign policy. Its understanding and support are welcome-- so are its questions.

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JDCW

8 SEP 1976

Executive Registry
76-3404

EHK briefing Foreign Service Institute
"Role of Intelligence in the Foreign Policy
Decision Making Process"

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